When Egos Killed the City: How Alleged Political Spite Turned Amaravati into a Ghost Town
A Single Election Nearly Decimated India’s Most Ambitious New Capital. But It Survived.
In October 2015, the Prime Minister of India stood on the banks of the Krishna River in Andhra Pradesh and laid the foundation stone for what was meant to become one of the great capital cities of the 21st century. Narendra Modi was flanked by N. Chandrababu Naidu, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh and the man who had spent decades building a reputation as the subcontinent’s foremost technology-focused urban developer, the politician who turned a provincial backwater into Cyberabad, now one of India’s premier IT hubs. The crowd was enormous. The architects involved were among the most celebrated in the world. The land had been assembled through a remarkably voluntary and cooperative process.
Eight years later the site was largely overgrown. Completed government buildings stood abandoned. The roads that had been built went nowhere. Farmers who had surrendered generations of family land for the project were dying from the stress and despair of waiting. And the man at the center of it all was the duly elected Chief Minister of an area called Andhra Pradesh.
Andhra Pradesh Needed a New Capital After a Painful Political Division
In 2014, the Indian government bifurcated Andhra Pradesh to create a new state called Telangana from its northwestern territory. The separation resolved a decades-long separatist movement. Hyderabad, the historic capital and by far the region’s wealthiest and most powerful city, was assigned to Telangana. The residual Andhra Pradesh, with 50 million people, was left without a capital.
Naidu, who won the state’s first post-bifurcation election, decided to build a new capital from scratch, on the banks of the Krishna River between the cities of Vijayawada and Guntur, on some of the most agriculturally productive land in southern India.
He named it Amaravati. The site is one of the most significant Buddhist settlements in India, home to one of the country’s largest ancient stupas, a place whose name translates roughly as “abode of the gods.” Naidu was not just building a capital. He was building a capital with 2,000 years of civilizational continuity behind it.
For the design he went to Foster and Partners, the firm Norman Foster built into one of the most respected architectural practices on earth. Foster designed the governmental heart of the city: a civic spine stretching 5.5 kilometers along the riverfront, the Legislature Assembly building set within a large freshwater lake, a High Court whose stepped roof was modeled on India’s ancient stupas, ribbon-like water bodies weaving between tree-lined boulevards, with at least 60 percent of the government complex reserved as greenery or water. Singapore’s Surbana Jurong developed the broader citywide master plan. The city was designed based on Putrajaya and Singapore: clean-slate capitals built for a future that didn’t yet exist rather than inherited from a colonial past.
The Land Came From 29,000 Farmers
Amaravati's approach to land assemblage was unusual for a new city in Asia. Compulsory land acquisition in India has been one of the country’s most persistent sources of political conflict and human suffering for decades. The Land Acquisition Act of 2013 tightened protections for displaced landowners, but implementation is uneven and the history of farmers being pushed off productive land for infrastructure projects with inadequate compensation runs long and ugly. Naidu designed around this. He created a land pooling scheme in which farmers would voluntarily contribute their land to the capital project and receive in exchange not cash but a proportional stake in the city that would be built on it: residential plots, commercial plots and annuity payments while they waited for development to mature. The premise was that they were investing in Amaravati, not selling to it.
More than 29,000 farmers from 29 villages contributed approximately 34,000 acres. These were not marginal or fallow lands. The Krishna River delta is among the most agriculturally productive soil in India, supporting multiple harvests per year. Farmers who had worked the same fields for generations, who measured their identity and their children’s inheritance in acres of paddy and sugarcane, handed those acres over on the basis of Naidu’s word and the government’s formal commitments.
By 2019 it was working. Construction was underway. Roads were being graded and paved. Government building frames were rising. The village of Tullur, sitting at the epicenter of the construction zone, was lively on weekends with construction workers spending wages in local shops and restaurants. Land values in the surrounding area were climbing as speculators and investors bet on the capital’s future.
Then Election That Turned Amaravati Into a Ghost Town
Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy of the YSR Congress Party won the 2019 state election decisively, and within months of taking office he announced that Andhra Pradesh would not have one capital but three. Executive government functions would move to Visakhapatnam on the northern coast. The judiciary would relocate to Kurnool in the southwest. The legislature alone would remain in Amaravati.
Jagan framed this as regional equity: a geographically large and economically diverse state deserved distributed governance rather than a single concentrated capital that would pull all investment and attention toward one area. Critics, including virtually everyone connected to Amaravati, were livid. Amaravati sat in Telugu Desam Party territory, the heartland of Naidu’s political base. A functioning capital there would deliver enormous economic gains to that base through land value appreciation, government employment, infrastructure spending and business activity. Moving the executive capital to Visakhapatnam, a YSRCP stronghold, redirected those gains.
Construction stopped. Not a single brick was laid at Amaravati during Jagan’s five-year tenure. The partially completed government buildings stood abandoned, their boundary walls disappearing into vegetation. Tullur emptied. The annuity payments to farmers arrived intermittently. The land the farmers had contributed sat frozen, generating neither the returns they had been promised nor the crops they had given up. Prime Amaravati land that had been rising toward Rs 1 to 2 crore per acre on the open market was suddenly worth far less as the capital’s future became uncertain.
At least 64 farmers died during what became known as the Amaravati movement, the sustained campaign by landowners and their families to force the restoration of the single-capital plan. The protest camp in Tullur ran continuously and without interruption for nearly six years. Women’s groups, farmers’ unions and ordinary families formed human chains around survey markers when new acquisition attempts were made. They burned effigies of government officials. They litigated in courts that moved at the pace Indian courts move while their promised returns and their pooled land sat in legal limbo.
The High Court of Andhra Pradesh eventually struck down the three-capitals plan and reinstated Amaravati as the sole capital. Jagan appealed and maneuvered through the legal system. In the final months before the 2024 election his government withdrew the land acquisition notification for additional acreage, a move interpreted almost universally as a deliberate attempt to further destabilize the project on his way out the door.
Another Election That De-Ghosted the Ghost Town
Naidu’s Telugu Desam Party won the June 2024 state elections and he returned to office. On May 2, 2025, Modi stood again in Amaravati and laid another foundation stone. The state government committed Rs 65,000 crore to the revival. Foster and Partners reissued statements about the project and its vision. The farmers who had maintained a vigil for six years were photographed weeping at the ceremony. Naidu declared at the relaunch that Amaravati symbolized the self-respect and self-confidence of the Telugu people and that 29,000 farmers had made an unprecedented act of faith that his government intended to honor.
Construction has restarted. The government has set a target of completing critical infrastructure by 2026. It has also initiated a second round of land pooling, seeking an additional 20,000-plus acres for expanded elements of the plan including an international sports city, a new airport and an inner ring road. That second acquisition is already producing new protests, this time from farmers who feel the compensation framework, set years ago when surrounding land values were a fraction of what they are today, is no longer equitable. The legal disputes from the Jagan years have not fully resolved. And the next state election is in 2029.
The Structural Problem Of Amaravati
What Amaravati revealed, beyond its own extraordinary drama, is a mismatch that India’s new city ambitions have not yet figured out how to solve. Building a capital city from scratch takes 25 to 50 years of sustained, consistent effort. Indian state elections happen every five years. A project of Amaravati’s scale and ambition requires political commitment that survives not just one election but six or eight of them, across administrations that may have sharply different interests in whether the project succeeds. This issue stymies the construction of new cities with federal support in the United States as well.
In most democratic contexts this tension is managed through institutional structures like independent infrastructure authorities, legal protections for project commitments and intergovernmental funding arrangements that make it expensive and difficult for a successor government to simply walk away. India has some of these mechanisms. In Andhra Pradesh they proved insufficient against a government that was sufficiently motivated to dismantle the project and willing to absorb the political cost of the farmers’ protest movement.
India is now building new cities across its landscape at a pace it has never attempted: Dholera in Gujarat, Amaravati in Andhra Pradesh, a dozen greenfield smart city projects along the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor, with a trillion-rupee Urban Challenge Fund committed in the 2025-26 budget to accelerate the program. All of these will take decades to mature. All of them will be inherited by governments that did not initiate them. Amaravati is the most vivid demonstration available of what happens when the inheritance goes badly, and of how much ordinary people can lose.
The farmers of the Krishna River delta are getting their city back, for now. Whether it is still standing, politically, after 2029 is a question that no master plan, no architecture firm and no foundation stone ceremony can answer.
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